Abstract -The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a finitely axiomatized theory that might be applicable as a foundational theory for mathematics. For that matter, some twenty axioms in a formal language are introduced, which are to hold in a universe consisting of a class of objects, each of which is a set, and a class of arrows, each of which is a function on a set. One of the axioms is nonclassical: it states that, given a family of ur-functions-i.e. functions on a singleton-with disjunct domains, there exists a uniquely determined sum function on the union of these domains. This 'sum function axiom' is so powerful that it allows to derive ZF from a finite axiom scheme. In addition, it is shown that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does not hold for the present theory, which therefore can be considered stronger than ZF. Furthermore, the axioms of category theory are proven to hold: the present universe may therefore serve as an ontological basis for category theory. However, it has not been investigated whether any of the soundness and completeness properties hold for the present theory: the inevitable conclusion is therefore that only further research can establish whether the present results indeed constitute an advancement in the foundations of mathematics.
Introduction
The ambition of this paper is threefold. Firstly, to introduce a first-order theory with a finite number of non-logical axioms of finite length. Secondly, to show that this new theory might be of practical use as a foundational theory for mathematics. Thirdly, to give a strong reason for further research in this direction by proving that this new theory is in a sense stronger than ZF-the most widely accepted foundational theory. The purpose of this introduction is to discuss these aims-the purpose is not, however, to review every idea ever published on this topic.
As to the first aim, at least one set theory that can be finitely axiomatized has already been suggested, namely Von Neumann-Gödel-Bernays set theory (NGB). However, as NGB is provably a mere conservative extension of ZF, "it seems to be no stronger than ZF" [1] . By contrast, the present finite theory is intended to be stronger than ZF-that is, to yield a meaningful result that doesn't hold in ZF. However, a finite theory in the same language as ZF (without extra objects) and as strong as ZF has already been proved impossible by Montague [2] : the present aim to formulate a finite theory stronger than ZF therefore necessitates a departure from the language and ontology of ZF. Earlier a radical departure has already been suggested by Lawvere, who formulated a theory of the category of sets: here the ∈-relation has been defined in terms of the primitive notions of category theory, that is, in terms of mappings, domains and codomains [3] . The present theory, however, is more of a marriage between set theory and category theory: the ∈-relation is maintained as an atomic expression, while the notion of a category is built in as the main structural element. So regarding the philosophical position on the status of category theory, here neither Lawvere's position is taken, that category theory provides the foundation for mathematics [4] , nor Mayberry's position that category theory requires set theory as a foundation [5] , nor Landry's position that category theory provides (all of) the language for mathematics [6] : instead, the present position is that category theory is incorporated in the foundations. To begin with, the universe of (mathematical) discourse is not Cantor's paradise of sets, but a category: Definition 1.1. The universe of discourse is a category C consisting of (i) a proper class of objects, each of which is a small set;
(ii) a proper class of arrows, each of which is a function on a small set.
The primitive notion of a set is, of course, that it is an object made up of elements: elementhood is formalized by the irreducible ∈-relation. This binary predicate is part of the present language too: there is no need to express it in the language of category theory, since that does not yield a simplification. (Hence the language of the present theory is not reduced to the language of category theory.) In ZF we then have the adage 'everything is a set', meaning that if we have x ∈ y, then x is a set too. Here, however, that adage remains valid in this proper class of objects only to the extent that all the objects are sets-the adage does not hold for all elements of all sets. That is, we will assume that every object of the category is either the empty set or an object that contains elements, but an element of an object-if any-can either be the empty set, or again an object made up of elements, or a function: a function is then not a set. A number of constructive set-theoretical axioms then describe in terms of the ∈-relation which sets there are at least in this proper class of sets; these axioms are very simple theorems of ZF that hardly need any elaboration. And as in ZF, we don't need to assume any constants in the language for the set-theoretical axioms.
In axiomatic set theory, a function is identified with its graph. However, as hinted at above, here we reject that set-theoretical reduction. First of all, functions on a set X are objects sui generis. If we use simple symbols like X and Y for sets, then a composite symbol f X can be used for a function on X: the symbol f refers to the graph of the function and X to its domain, but we have f X = Y for any function on any domain X and for any set Y . To give an example, let the numbers 0 and 1 be defined as sets, e.g. by 0 := ∅ and 1 := {∅}, and let, for sets x and y, a two-tuple x, y be defined as a set, e.g. by x, y := {x, {x, y}}; then the composite symbol { 0, 1 , 1, 0 } {0,1} refers to the function on the set {0, 1} whose graph is the set { 0, 1 , 1, 0 }; we have, however, that { 0, 1 , 1, 0 } {0,1} = { 0, 1 , 1, 0 }
That is, the function { 0, 1 , 1, 0 } {0,1} is not identical to its graph { 0, 1 , 1, 0 }-nor, in fact, to any other set X. At this point one might be inclined to think that the whole idea of functions on a set as objects sui generis is superfluous, and should be eliminated in favor of the idea that functions are identified with their graphs (which are sets). That, however, has already been tried in an earlier stage of this investigation: it turned out to lead to unsolvable difficulties with the interpretation of the formalism, cf. [7] . The crux is that the main constructive axiom of the theory-here a constructive axiom is an axiom that, when certain things are given (e.g. one or two sets or a set and a predicate), states the existence of a uniquely determined other thing [8] -'produces' things referred to by a symbol F X : one gets into unsolvable difficulties if one tries to interpret these things as sets. But functions f X are not only different things than sets. Contrary to a set, a function in addition has a domain and a codomain-both are sets-and it also does something: namely, it maps every element in its domain to an element in its codomain. This first aspect, that a function 'has' a domain and a codomain, can be expressed in the language of category theory: an atomic formula f X : Y → Z expresses that the function f X on the set X has domain Y and codomain Z. Since this expression is irreducible in the present framework, it requires some function-theoretical axioms to specify when such an atomic formula is true and when not. For example, for the function { 0, 1 , 1, 0 } {0,1} discussed above we have
while other expressions { 0, 1 , 1, 0 } {0,1} : Y → Z are false. Again, at this point one might be inclined to think that these expression f X : Y → Z are superfluous, because the notation f X already indicates that X is the domain of f X . The crux, however, is that these expressions are essential to get to a finite axiomatization: we may, then, have the opinion that it is obvious from the notation f X that X is the domain of f X , but only an expression f X : X → Z expresses this fact-it is, thus, an axiom of the theory that f X : Y → Z is only true if Y = X. In particular, this expression is not true if Y X. The second aspect, that a function f X on a set X 'maps' an element y of its domain to an element z of its codomain is expressed by another atomic formula f X : y → z. In the framework of ZF this is just a notation for (y, z) ∈ f X , but in the present framework this is also an irreducible expression: therefore, it requires some more function-theoretical axioms to specify when such an atomic formula is true and when not. The idea, however, is this: given a function f X on a set X, precisely one expression f X : y → z is true for each element y in the domain of f X . E.g. for the above function { 0, 1 , 1, 0 } {0,1} we have
For the function-theoretical axioms we don't need to assume any constants in the language either.
All the above can be expressed with a dozen and a half very simple axioms-these can, in fact, all be reformulated in the framework of ZF. The present axiomatic scheme does, however, contain 'new mathematics' in the form of the second axiom of a pair of constructive, function-theoretical axioms. The first one is again very simple, and merely states that given any two singletons X and Y (sets with only one element), there exists an 'ur-function' that maps the one element of X to the one element of Y . An ur-function is thus a function f X on a set X with a singleton domain and a singleton codomain. The above function { 0, 1 , 1, 0 } {0,1} is thus not an ur-function, but the function referred to by the symbol { 0, 1 } {0} is: we have
That said, the second of the pair of constructive, function-theoretical axioms is a new mathematical principle: it states that given any family of ur-functions f {j} with j ranging over any set Z, there exists a sum function F Z on Z such that the sum function maps an element j of Z to the same image as the corresponding ur-function f {j} . The formulation of this principle requires, however, a new non-classical concept that can be called a 'multiple quantifier'. This new concept can be explained as follows. Suppose we have defined the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . as sets, suppose their successors {0}, {1}, {2}, . . . exist as well, and suppose we also have the set of natural numbers ω = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. We can, then, consider variables f {0} , f {1} , f {2} , . . . ranging over all ur-functions on a singleton as indicated by the subscriptso, f {0} is a variable that ranges over all ur-functions on the singleton {0}. In the classical first-order language of ZF we have the possibility to quantify over all ur-functions on a singleton {a} by using a quantifier ∀f {a} , and we have the possibility to use any finite number of such quantifiers in a sentence. E.g. we can have a formula
meaning: for all ur-functions on {0} and for all ur-functions on {1} and for all ur-functions on {2}, Ψ. We can then introduce a new notation by the following postulate of meaning:
This new formula can be read as: for any family of ur-functions indexed in {0, 1, 2}, Ψ. So (∀f {i} ) i∈{0,1,2} is then a multiple quantifier that, in this case, is equivalent to three quantifiers in classical first-order language. The next step is now that we lift the restriction that a multiple quantifier has to be equivalent to a finite number of classical quantifiers: with that step we enter into nonclassical territory. In the nonclassical language we can consider a formula like
The multiple quantifier is equivalent to infinitely many classical quantifiers ∀f {0} , ∀f {1} , ∀f {2} , . . . in this case. But in the present framework the constant ω in formula (9) can be replaced by any constant, yielding nonclassical multiple quantifiers equivalent to an uncountably infinite number of classical quantifiers.
To yield meaningful theorems, the subformula Ψ of formula (9) has to be open in infinitely many variables f {0} , f {1} , f {2} , . . . ranging over all ur-functions on a singleton. This is achieved by placing a conjunctive operator i∈ω in front of a classical first-order formula Ψ(f {i} ) that is open in a composite variable f {i} , yielding an expression
Syntactically this is a formula of finite length, but semantically it is the conjunction of a countably infinite family of formulas Ψ(f {0} ), Ψ(f {1} ), Ψ(f {2} ), . . .. Together with the multiple quantifier from formula (9) it yields a sentence: semantically it contains a bound occurrence of the variables f {0} , f {1} , f {2} , . . .. The nonclassical 'sum function axiom' constructed with these formal language elements is so powerful that it allows to derive the infinite schemes SEP and SUB of ZF from just a finite number of axioms. That brings us to the stated second aim of this paper, that the new finite theory is intended to be of (possible) practical use as a foundational theory. The practical usefulness of the scheme lies therein that it (i) provides an easy way to construct sets, and (ii) that categories like Top, Mon, Grp, etc, which are subjects of study in category theory, can be viewed as subcategories of the category of sets and functions of Def. 1.1, thus providing a new approach to the foundational problem identified in [9] . While that latter point hardly needs elaboration, the former does. The crux is that one doesn't need to apply the nonclassical sum function axiom directly: what one uses is the theorem-or rather: the theorem scheme-that given any set X, we can construct a new function on X by giving a function prescription. So, this is a philosophical nuance: in ZF one constructs a new object with the ∈-relation, but in the present framework one can construct a new function f X not with the ∈-relation, but by simply defining which expressions f X : y → z are true for the elements y in the domain. On account of the sum function axiom, it is then a guarantee that the function f X exists. So, very simply, given any set X one simply defines
where Φ(y, z) is any functional relation, and it is then a guarantee that f X exists. And having constructed the function, we have implicitly constructed its graph and its image set. Ergo, giving a function prescription is constructing a set. The nonclassical axiom, which may be cumbersome to use directly, stays thus in the background: one uses the main theorem of the theory. Still, one might object that in the framework of ZF we can, arguably, also define a new function by giving a function prescription. In addition, we can also give a finite axiomatization of ZF if we would drop the restriction that formulas have to be finite, that is, have to be strings of a finite number of symbols: we would only have to introduce the infinite conjunction of all the formulas the Separation Axiom Scheme of ZF and we're done. So then, we would also have a finitely axiomatized theory in which new objects can be created by giving a function prescription. And that brings us to the third stated aim of this paper, which is that the new theory is intended to be stronger than ZF. The argument is as follows. First it will be proven that ZF can be derived from the new theory: that proves that the new theory is not weaker than ZF. Second, it will be proven that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does not hold for the new theory: if the new theory has a model M , then M is uncountable. This is a significant result that does not hold in the framework of ZF: it provides, therefore, an argument that the new theory is stronger than ZF.
That concludes the introductory discussion. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section axiomatically introduces this finitely axiomatized nonclassical theory and derives the main theorem. The section thereafter shows that ZF can be derived, that the axioms of category theory hold for the class of arrows of the universe of Def. 1.1, and that the nonclassical theory is stronger than ZF in the sense that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does not hold for the nonclassical theory; in addition, it is argued why the nonclassical first-order theory does not amount to a second-order theory. The final section states the conclusions.
Axiomatic introduction 2.1 Formal language
First of all a remark. In classical first-order logic, the term 'quantifier' refers both to the logical symbols '∀' and '∃' and to combinations like ∀x, ∃y consisting of such a symbol and a variable. While that may be unproblematic in classical logic, here the logical symbols '∀' and '∃' are applied in different kinds of quantifiers. Therefore, to avoid confusion we will refer to the symbol '∀' with the term 'universal quantification symbol', and to the symbol '∃' with the term 'existential quantification symbol'. The vocabulary as defined below contains a constant because this simplifies the introduction of the theory, but it is emphasized that the theory can in principle be formulated without constants in the vocabulary. (ii) simple variables x, X, y, Y, . . . ranging over sets; (iii) for any constant X referring to an individual set, simple variables f X , g X , . . . with an occurrence of the constant X as the subscript, ranging over functions on that set X (iv) for any simple variable X ranging over sets, composite variables f X , g X , . . . (with an occurrence of the variable X as the subscript) ranging over functions on a set X; Remark 2.2. After the introduction of the 'classical' first-order axioms of the theory, the vocabulary will be extended to enable the construction of the desired nonclassical formulas.
Remark 2.3. In the next section, the vocabulary will be supplemented with constants after the individuals to which they refer have been constructed from the axioms of the theory. On account of clause (iii) of Def. 2.1, for any new constant X referring to an individual set we get additional simple variables f X , g X , .
. . with an occurrence of the constant X as the subscript, ranging over functions on that set X. Such variables, however, are not needed for the formulation of the theory.
Definition 2.4. The syntax of the language is defined by the following clauses:
(i) if t is a constant, or a simple or a composite variable, then t is a term;
(ii) if t 1 and t 2 are terms, then t 1 = t 2 and t 1 ∈ t 2 are atomic formulas;
(iii) if t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 are terms, then t 1 : t 2 → t 3 and t 1 : t 2 → t 3 are atomic formulas;
(iv) if Φ and Ψ are formulas, then ¬Φ,
(v) if Ψ is a formula and t a simple variable ranging over sets, over all things, or over functions on a constant set, then ∀tΨ is a formula;
(vi) if Ψ is a formula, X a simple variable ranging over sets, and f X a composite variable, then ∀X∀f X Ψ is a formula;
(vii) outer parentheses '(' and ')' can be added or omitted when convenient.
Remark 2.5. After the introduction of the 'classical' first-order axioms of the theory, the syntax will be extended with additional clauses to enable the construction of the desired nonclassical formulas.
Definition 2.6. The language contains the following special language elements:
(i) if t is a simple variable ranging over sets, over all things, or over functions on a constant set, then ∀t and ∃t are simple quantifiers;
(ii) if X ranges over sets and f X is a composite variable, then ∀X∀f X is a double quantifier.
The scope of a simple quantifier is defined as usual, and so are the definitions of a free occurrence and a bounded occurrence of a simple variable. These things can be simply defined for formulas with a double quantifier.
Definition 2.7. If ∀X∀f X Ψ is a subformula of a formula Φ, then Ψ is the scope of the double quantifier ∀X∀f X . Furthermore, (i) an occurrence of a composite variable f X in a formula Ψ is free if that occurrence is not in the scope of a double quantifier ∀X∀f X ;
(ii) an occurrence of a composite variable f X in a formula Ψ is bounded if that occurrence is in the scope of a double quantifier ∀X∀f X .
A sentence is a formula with no free variables-simple or composite. 
Set-theoretical axioms
Below the set-theoretical axioms are listed; these are all classical first-order formulas. Due to the simplicity of the axioms, comments are kept to a bare minimum.
Axiom 2.9. Extensionality Axiom for Sets (EXT): two sets X and Y are identical if they have the same things (sets and functions) as elements.
Axiom 2.10. Any function f X on any set X is not identical to any set Y :
Axiom 2.11. A set X has no domain or codomain, nor does it map any thing to an image:
These latter two axioms establish that sets are different from functions on a set, and do not have the properties of functions on a set.
Axiom 2.12. Empty Set Axiom (EMPTY): there exists a set X, designated by the constant ∅, that has no elements.
Axiom 2.13. Axiom of Pairing (PAIR): for every thing α and every thin β there exists a set X that has precisely the things α and β as its elements.
Notation 2.14. The set X in Ax. 2.13 is unique and can be denoted by the symbol {α, β}; this is a singleton {α} when α = β. This is henceforth a part of the vocabulary, so if α is a variable ranging over all things, then {α} is a variable ranging over all singletons.
Axiom 2.15. Sum Set Axiom (SUM): for every set X there exists a set Y = X made up of the elements of the elements of X.
Notation 2.16. The set Y in Ax. 2.15 is unique and can be denoted by the symbol X.
Axiom 2.17. Powerset Axiom (POW): for every set X there is a set Y made up of the subsets of X.
Notation 2.18. The set Y in Ax. 2.17 is unique and can be denoted by the symbol P(X).
Axiom 2.19. Infinite Set Axiom (INF): there exists a set X that has the empty set as element, as well as the successor {y} of each set y in X.
Remark 2.20. The set X is not unique. But the smallest set that satisfies the axiom can be denoted by the constant ω, for which ω = {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, . . .}.
Axiom 2.21. Axiom of Regularity (REG): every nonempty set X contains an element Y that has no elements in common with X.
Axiom 2.22. Difference Set Axiom (DIFF): For every pair of sets X and Y there is a set Z such that the elements of Z are precisely those elements of X that do not occur in Y .
Notation 2.23. The set Z in Ax. 2.22 is unique and can be denoted by the symbol X − Y .
Definition 2.24. For any things α and β, the two-tuple (α, β) is a set defined by
This set is unique and can be denoted as (α, β) = {α, {α, β}}.
Theorem 2.25. For every two things α and β there is a singleton X containing the two-tuple (α, β).
Proof. Given a thing α and a thing β, on account of PAIR (Ax. 2.13) we have subsequently the set {α, β}, the set {α, {α, β}}, and the set {{α, {α, β}}}. The latter is the set { α, β } as requested.
In principle, these set-theoretical axioms suffice: the function-theoretical axioms in the next section provide other means for the construction of sets.
Classical function-theoretical axioms
Axiom 2.26. General Function-Theoretical Axiom (GEN): any function f X on any nonempty set X has X as domain and some set Y as co-domain, such that f X maps every element of X to a unique image and such that Y is precisely the image set:
Notation 2.27. The codomain Y in GEN is unique as a set and can be denoted f X [X] or cod(f X ). In addition, the image β of an element α ∈ X under f X is also unique, and can be denoted f X (α).
Remark 2.28. Note that GEN provides a tool to construct a set: if we can construct a new function f X on a set X from existing functions (an axiom will be given further below), then by this axiom we immediately have the image set f X [X].
Axiom 2.29. A function f X on a set X has no elements:
Remark 2.30. One might think that Ax. 2.29 destroys the uniqueness of the empty set. But that is not true. It is true that a function f X on a set X and the empty set share the property that they have no elements, but the empty set is the only set that has this property: Ax. 2.11 guarantees, namely, a function f X on a set X is not a set! Axiom 2.31. Any function f X on any nonempty set X with codomain Y does not take an element outside the domain X as argument:
Remark 2.32. Ax. 2.26 dictates that precisely one expression f X : α → β is true for each α ∈ X. This doesn't a priori exclude that such an expression can also be true for another thing α not in X. But by Ax. 2.31 this is excluded.
Notation 2.33. For any function f X on any set X and for any thing α ∈ X we can use the iota-operator to designate 'the thing to which α is mapped by f X ' by a symbol 'ıβ(f X : α → β)'. We get
We could also try to include the iota-operator in the general vocabulary and declare ıβ(f X : α → β) to be a term of the language for any function f X on any set X and for any thing α. Obviously, for α ∈ X the term ıβ(f X : α → β) then does not refer to any thing in the category of sets and functions, see Ax.
2.31. But it might still be meaningful to say that the thing to which α is mapped by f X is nonexisting, has no elements, is not the element of any set, is not the (co-)domain of any function, nor the argument of any function nor the image of any argument of any function. So, let, for constants f X and α ∈ X, the term ıβ(f X : α → β) be a constant of the language; sentences containing this constant then still might have a meaning when all atomic expressions containing this constant are declared to be false. So, we consider the following 'axioms'
But from universal instantiation of the above formulas we get
This is hard to swallow, in particular the second member of the conjunction; a way out may be to apply Bochvar's theory of nonsense, cf. [10] , to sentences in which a nonexisting definite description occurs, but this is outside the scope of the present study. We should therefore not attempt to include the iotaoperator as a part of the general vocabulary: we only consider a term 'ıβ(f X : α → β)' as a notation for f X (α) in those cases where we have an existing image of α under f X .
Axiom 2.34. Any function f X on any nonempty set X has no other domain than X:
Axiom 2.35. Any function f X on any nonempty set X has no other codomain than the image set f X [X]:
Remark 2.36. Ax. 2.26 dictates that for any set X, a function f X has a domain X and a codomain f X [X]. That is, for any set X and for any function f X on X, the expression f X : A → B is true for A = X and B = f X [X]. But this doesn't exclude a priori that such an expression can also be true for other things α and β. Only by Axs. 2.34 and 2.35, this is excluded.
Axiom 2.37. Reverse Image Set Axiom (REV): for any function f X on any nonempty set X with codomain Y and for any thing α, there is a reverse image set Z ⊂ Y that contains precisely the elements of X that are mapped to α by f X :
Notation 2.38. This reverse image set is unique and can be denoted f −1 X (α). Remark 2.39. Note that REV, in addition to GEN, also provides a tool to construct a set: if we can construct a new function f X on a set X from existing functions, then by this axiom we immediately have the reverse image sets f 
Axiom 2.41. Empty Function Axiom (EMPTY-F): there exists a function f ∅ on the empty set, which has the empty set as domain and codomain, and which doesn't map any argument to any image:
Notation 2.42. This empty function is unique and can be denoted 1 ∅ . Note that there can be no other functions f ∅ on the empty set, since the image set f ∅ [∅] is always empty: the expression f ∅ : ∅ → A cannot be true for any nonempty set A.
Axiom 2.43. Ur-Function Axiom (UFA): for any things α and β there exists an ur-function f {α} with domain {α} and codomain {β} that maps α to β:
It is easy to prove that the graph {(α, β)} of such an ur-function f {α} : {α} → {β} exists: this follows straight from Th. 2.25.
Notation 2.44. The ur-function f {α} : {α} → {β} from Ax. 2.43 is unique. It can be denoted by {(α, β)} {α} , or 1 {α} in case α = β.
Axiom 2.45. Axiom of Regularity for Functions (REG-F): no function f X on any set X with any codomain Y takes itself as argument or has itself as image:
Remark 2.46. As to the first part, Wittgenstein already mentioned that a function cannot have itself as argument [11] . The second part is to exclude the existence of pathological 'Siamese twin functions' f X and g Y given by
We thus have dom(f X ) = X = {g Y } and dom(g Y ) = Y = {f X }; if one tries to substitute that in the above Eqs., then one gets 'infinite towers'. These may not be constructible from the axioms, but they could exist a priori in the category of sets and functions: that should be avoided at all cost.
The nonclassical function-theoretical axiom and elimination rules
Definition 2.47. The vocabulary of the language is extended with the 'conjunctor' . The syntax of the language is extended with the following clauses:
(i) if α is a simple variable ranging over all things, Ψ(α) a formula open in α, X a constant designating a set or a simple variable ranging over sets, then α∈X Ψ(α) is a formula;
(ii) if α is a simple variable ranging over all things, f {α} a composite variable ranging over ur-functions on {α}, Ψ a formula with a subformula α∈X Ψ(α), and Z a constant designating a set or a simple variable ranging over sets, then (∀f {α} ) α∈Z Ψ is a formula.
Definition 2.48. The following special language elements are added:
(i) if X is a constant designating a set or a variable ranging over sets, α a simple variable ranging over all things, f {α} a composite variable ranging over ur-functions on {α}, then (∀f {α} ) α∈X is a multiple quantifier;
(ii) if X is a constant designating a set or a variable ranging over sets, and α a simple variable ranging over all things, then α∈X is a conjunctive operator.
Definition 2.49. If α∈X Ψ is a subformula of a formula Φ, then Ψ is the scope of the conjunctive operator. If X is a constant designating a set, and the formula Φ(f {α} ) in the scope of the conjunctive operator is open in the composite variable f {α} , then the subformula α∈X Ψ(f {α} ) has a free semantic occurrence of each of the simple variables f {α} with a constant α ∈ X. (For a thing designated by constant α ∈ X, a simple variable f {α} thus ranges over all ur-functions on the singleton designated by the constant {α}.) The formula α∈X Ψ(f {α} ) has thus to be viewed as the conjugation of all the instances [f {α} \f {α} ]Ψ(f {α} ) of Ψ(f {α} ). If X is a constant designating a set, and (f {α} ) α∈X is a family of constants (so that for each constant α ∈ X the symbol f {α} designates a well-defined ur-function on {α}), and if Ψ(f {α} ) is a sentence with an occurrence of the constant f {α} , then a formula α∈X [f {α} \f {α} ]Ψ((f {α} ) is a sentence with a semantic occurrence of each of the constants f {α} with α ∈ X-the formula α∈X Ψ((f {α} ) has thus to be viewed as the conjugation of all the sentences Ψ(f {α} ) (one such sentence for each α ∈ X). Definition 2.50. If (∀f {α} ) α∈X Ψ is a subformula of a formula Φ, then Ψ is the scope of the multiple quantifier. If X is a constant designating a set, and if (∀f {α} ) α∈X Ψ is a subformula of a formula Φ such that the formula Ψ in the scope of the multiple quantifier is semantically open in the family of simple variables (f {α} ) α∈X , then (∀f {α} ) α∈X Ψ has a bounded semantic occurrence of each of the simple variables f {α} with a constant α ∈ X. The multiple quantifier (∀f {α} ) α∈X is thus semantically equivalent to a quantification over all ur-functions on all singletons contained in X. Definition 2.51. The semantics of the nonclassical formulas are as follows:
(i) a sentence α∈X Ψ is true if for each semantically occurring constant f {α} the corresponding instance of the subformula Ψ in the scope of the conjunctive operator is true;
(ii) a sentence (∀f {α} ) α∈X Ψ is true if for each set of constant values assigned to semantically occurring simple variables f {α} (one constant value for each variable) the corresponding instance of Ψ, with a semantic occurrence of each of the assigned constant values, is true.
Axiom 2.52. Sum Function Axiom (SUM-F): for any nonempty set X and for any family of ur-functions f {α} indexed in X, there is a sum function F X on X with some codomain Y such that the multiple conjunction of all mapping relations F X : α → ıβ(f {α} : α → β) for α ∈ X is true:
With SUM-F, all non-logical axioms of the present nonclassical theory have been introduced. But given that a multiple quantifier (∀f {α} ) α∈X is a new concept in logic, rules for the elimination of the simple quantifier ∀X and the multiple quantifier from SUM-F must be given to derive theorems; these rules of inference that follow have to be seen as part of the logic. The two required rules are then straightforward:
Inference Rule 2.53. Single Universal Elimination:
where ∀X = ∅Ψ is formula (40) of Ax. 2.52.
Thus speaking, from SUM-F we can deduce a formula
for any constant X designating a set.
Inference Rule 2.54. Multiple Universal Elimination:
where (∀f {α} ) α∈X Φ is an instance (42) of SUM-F as derived by rule 2.53 and where f (α) {α} is a welldefined constant designating an ur-function on {α} for every constant value of α ∈ X.
Thus speaking, from any instance (42) of SUM-F as derived by rule 2.53 we can deduce a formula
for any for any family (f (α) {α} ) α∈X of constants designating an ur-function on a singleton containing an element of X. A simple example of an object f (α) {α} is {(α, {α})} {α} : this is the ur-function on {α} that maps α to {α}, so upon assigning a constant value to α, we immediately have a well-defined ur-function.
Example 2.55. Consider the set ω from Rem. 2.20, for which we write ω := {0, 1, 2, . . .}. For each α ∈ ω we then have an ur-function
so that f (α) {α} := {(α, α 2 )} {α} , cf. Notation 2.44, and ıβ(f (α) {α} : α → β) = α 2 . Substituting this in formula (44) yields
In other words, there exists a function F ω on ω that maps every α ∈ ω to its square α 2 .
Inference Rule 2.56. Conjunctive Operator Elimination:
where Ψ is a formula (44) as derived by rule 2.54 from an instance (42) of SUM-F, and where f {α} is the constant designating the ur-function on {α}.
Thus speaking, from a formula (44) we can derive an entire classical formula scheme, consisting of one formula for each constant f {α} . Note that the 'f ' in f {α} and f {β} does not symbolize one and the same graph for different constants α and β-we have f {α} = f (α) {α} ! Example 2.57. Consider the function F ω on ω from Ex. 2.55. Applying the Conjugator Elimination Rule, we deduce the following scheme from formula (46):
etcetera. So, this is a countably infinite scheme of formulas. It is emphasized, however, that the existence of the function F ω with the properties mentioned in Ex. 2.55 does not follow from this infinite scheme. To see that, just look at the three formulas displayed above: formula (48) says that there is a function on ω that maps 0 to 0, formula (49) says that there is a function on ω that maps 1 to 1, and formula (50) says that there is a function on ω that maps 2 to 4. These are not necessarily statements about one and the same function on ω.
To get a scheme of formulas for one and the same function on a set X, first rule-C (the Existential Elimination Rule) has to be applied (twice) to a formula (44) as derived by rule 2.54 from an instance (42) of SUM-F. This yields a formula
And then Conjunctive Operator Elimination can be applied; this yields a scheme
(one formula for each constant α ∈ X). This is, then, a scheme about one and the same function on X.
Remark 2.58. An explicit definition of what constitutes a sentence in the nonclassical language has been omitted, but it has to be taken (i) that SUM-F is a sentence;
(ii) that an instance (42) of SUM-F is a sentence;
(iii) that a formula (44) obtained from an instance of SUM-F is a sentence.
Note that the scheme (52) derived from such a formula (44) is made up of (classical first-order) sentences: these sentences are derived from sentences. We thus get that SUM-F is true if every instance (42) of SUM-F obtained by Single Universal Elimination is true; that an instance (42) of SUM-F is true if every formula (44) obtained by Multiple Universal Elimination is true; and that a formula (44) is true if, after applying Rule-C twice, every formula (52) obtained by Conjugator Elimination is true.
This concludes the axiomatic introduction of the nonclassical theory.
Main theorems
Theorem 2.59. Graph Theorem: for any function f X on any set X with any codomain Y , there is a set Z that is precisely the graph of f X -that is, there is a set Z whose elements are precisely the two-tuples (α, β) made up of arguments and images of f X . In a formula:
Proof. Given f X , for any α ∈ X there is precisely one β such that f X : α → β on account of GEN (Ax. 2.26). On account of PAIR (Ax. 2.13) and Th. 2.25) there exists then for each α ∈ X a singleton {(α, β)} such that f X : α → β. But for each α ∈ X there exists then also an ur-function g {α} : {α} → {(α, β)} , g {α} : α → (α, β) on account of UFA (Ax. 2.43). Thus, on account of SUM-F there is a sum function G X on X with some codomain Z such that G X maps every α ∈ X precisely to the two-tuple (α, β) for which f X : α → β. On account of GEN, the codomain Z of G X exists and is unique: this is precisely the graph of f X .
Notation 2.60. Let X be a constant designating an individual set; an individual function on that set can then be designated by a constant G X , where G is a constant designating the graph of the function.
Theorem 2.61. Main Theorem: if there is a functional relation Φ(α, β) that relates every α of a nonempty set X to precisely one β, then there is a function F X on X with some codomain Y that maps every η ∈ X to precisely that ξ ∈ Y for which Φ(η, ξ). In a formula, using the iota-operator:
Proof. Let X be an arbitrary nonempty set. Suppose then, that for every α ∈ X we have precisely one β such that Φ(α, β). On account of PAIR (Ax. 2.13), for every α ∈ X there are thus singletons {α} and {β} such that Φ(α, β). On account of UFA (Ax. 2.43), for each α ∈ X there exists then also an ur-function f {α} implicitly defined by
On account of SUM-F there exists then also a sum function F X with some codomain Y that maps every α ∈ X to its image ıβ(f {α} α → β) under the ur-function f {α} . We thus have
On account of Rule-C, Conjunctive Operator Elimination, followed by universal generalization and existential generalization we then get
Since the functional relation was assumed, we get ∀α ∈ X∃!βΦ(α, β) ⇒ Ψ where Ψ is formula (57). Since X was an arbitrary nonempty set, we can quantify over nonempty sets. This gives precisely the requested formula (54).
Remark 2.62. Theorem 2.61 is an infinite scheme, with one formula for every functional relation Φ. The point is this: given a set X, on account of this theorem we can construct a function f X on X by giving a function prescription-what we then actually to is defining an ur-function for every α ∈ X; the function f X then exists on account of SUM-F. And by constructing the function we construct its graph, which exists on account of Th. 2.59. Generally speaking, if we define an ur-function for each singleton {α} ⊂ X, then we do not yet have the graphs of these ur-functions in a set. But in the present framework, the set of these graphs is guaranteed. Ergo, giving a function prescription is constructing a set! 3 Discussion
Derivation of SEP and SUB of ZF
First we derive the infinite axiom scheme SEP of ZF. For that matter, we have to prove that the following theorem holds for any formula Φ:
Proof. Let X be any set. Consider, for any α ∈ X, the ur-function f {α} on {α} for which
Again using the iota-operator, we thus have
On account of Th. 2.61, we thus have a sum function F X on X that maps every α ∈ X to its image ıξ(f {α} : α → ξ) under the ur-function f {α} on {α}. On account of REV (Ax. 2.37), the reverse image set F −1 X (1) then exists. This is precisely the set Y requested.
We proceed by deriving the infinite axiom scheme SUB of ZF from the axioms of FAST. For that matter, we have to prove that the following theorem holds for any set X and for any functional relation Φ:
Proof. Suppose that for every α ∈ X we have precisely one β such that Φ(α, β). Then on account of Th. 2.61, there is a function f X on X with some codomain Y for which
where the ur-functions f {α} on the singleton {α} are defined as in formula (55).
is then unique, and is precisely the set Z of Th. 3.2.
These two theorems, or better: theorem schemes, prove that the present nonclassical theory is in any case not weaker than ZF.
The axioms of category theory
In Def. 1.1 it has been assumed that the universe of sets and functions on sets is a category. In this section we prove that the axioms for category theory for the arrows hold for the functions on a set (which are the arrows of the present category). That means that we must prove the following:
(i) that domain and codomain of a function on a set are unique;
(ii) that, given a function f X on a set X and a function g Y on a set
, there is a function h X = g Y • f X on X such that h maps every α ∈ X to the image under g Y of its image under f X ;
(iii) that for every set X there is a function 1
Ad(i): domain and codomain of a function f X of a set X are unique This has already been proven in Sect. 2.3. GEN (Ax. 2.26) guarantees that a function f X on a set X has at least the set X as its domain and at least its image set f X [X] as its codomain. Ax. 2.34 guarantees that no other thing (set or function on a set) is the domain of f X . And Ax. 2.35 guarantees that no other thing (set or function on a set) is the codomain of f X . That proves uniqueness of domain and codomain.
Ad(ii): existence of the composite of two functions Given a function f X on a set X and a function g Y on the set Y = f X [X], there is for every α ∈ X precisely one ur-function h {α} on {α} such that
So, there is a sum function H X on X that maps each α ∈ X precisely to its image under the ur-function h {α} on {α} for which ıξ(h {α} : α → ξ) = ıβ(g X : f X (α) → β). This sum function is precisely the composite
The proof that function composition is associative is omitted.
Ad(iii): existence of an identity function on any set X Given a set X, there is for every α ∈ X precisely one ur-function 1 {α} on {α} such that
See Notation 2.44. Therefore, there is a sum function F X on X that maps every α ∈ X precisely to ıξ(1 {α} : α → ξ) = α. This sum function is the requested function 1 X . The proof that this sum function 1 X satisfies the properties that g X • 1 X = g X and 1 g X [X] • g X = g X for any function g X on X, is omitted.
This shows that the axioms for a category hold for the proper class of functions on a set X.
Proof that the nonclassical theory is stronger than ZF
We first prove that the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem does not hold for the present nonclassical theory, which will be denoted by the letter T in this section.
Proposition 3.3.
If T has a model M, then M is uncountable.
Proof. Suppose T has a model M, and M is countable. That means that there are only countably many subsets of ω = {0, 1, 2, . . .} in M, and that the powerset P(ω) in M contains those subsets: we thus assume that there are subsets of ω that are "missing" in M. Let A be any subset of ω that is not in M, and let h ∈ A. All numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . are in M, since 0 = ∅ exists on account of EMPTY (Ax. 2.12) and n + 1 = {n} exists on account of PAIR (Ax. 2.13). For any two numbers p and q, there is thus an ur-function f p on {p} in M such that f p : p → q on account of UFA (Ax. 2.43). Since ω is in M, we get on account of SUM-F and Single Universal Elimination that the formula
It should be realized that (∀f {p} ) p∈ω is a multiple quantifier that is equivalent to countably many simple quantifiers ∀f {n} (one such quantifier for each n ∈ ω). An instantiation is thus that, for the constant n ∈ ω, to the variable f {n} the constant value f {n} is assigned, such that f {n} : n → n if n ∈ A and f {n} : n → h if n ∈ A. Then on account of Multiple Universal Elimination we get
But then we get This is a significant result that does not hold in ZF, and it shows that T is stronger than ZF.
We proceed by addressing the main concern regarding inconsistency, which is that the existence of a set of all sets can be derived from T . That is not the case (i) because T contains REG (Ax. 2.21) and (ii) because the only constructive axiom of T that is not a theorem of ZF is SUM-F. The crux is that one must first have constructed the set X before one can construct a sum function F X on X: the set X is thus a regular set, and by applying SUM-F one cannot create a new set with a higher cardinality than the set X because the graph of F X contains precisely one element for each element of X. The same for the image set F X [X]: it cannot have a higher cardinality than X. Therefore, SUM-F doesn't allow the construction of a set of all sets.
Furthermore, also a set Ω of all functions is excluded. So, suppose that we have a set Ω such that
Then on account of Th. 3.1 we can single out the subset Ω 1 of all identity functions:
For each 1 X ∈ Ω 1 we define the ur-function g {1 X } by
Then we have the sum function G Ω1 : its image set G Ω1 [Ω 1 ] is the set of all sets U, which is not regular since 1 U ∈ Ω 1 so that U ∈ U. Ergo, there is no set Ω of all functions.
Argument against second-order character of the nonclassical theory
One might raise the objection against the present nonclassical theory that a multiple quantifier (∀f {α} ) α∈X is actually the same as a second-order quantifier ∀Φ where Φ is a variable that varies over functional relations on the class of all things. In this section we argue, however, that this is not at all the same.
First consider second-order quantification. If we eliminate the second-order quantifier ∀Φ from a formula ∀ΦΨ, then we get an instance [Φ\Φ]Ψ in which the second-order variable Φ has been replaced by a constant functional relation Φ. Assigning such a constant value to a second-order variable amounts to assigning a constant value to a simple variable f {α} ranging over ur-functions on {α} for a proper class of things α, because the functional relation has the entire class of things as its 'domain'-each thing in the entire class is then related to a unique an image, which is identical to its image under the corresponding ur-function. Eliminating a multiple quantifier (∀f {α} ) α∈X , on the other hand, amounts only to assigning a constant value to a simple variable ranging over ur-functions for a set of things α. Thus speaking, a second second-order quantifier ∀Φ is equivalent to a proper class of simple quantifiers ∀f {α} , whereas a multiple quantifier in the present framework is at most equivalent to an infinite set of simple quantifiers ∀f {α} -the degree of infinity is then bounded by the notion of a set. Thus speaking, since a set does not amount to a proper class, a multiple quantifier (∀f {α} ) α∈X is a far cry from a second-order quantifier ∀Φ. See the figure below for an illustration. Concluding, the present nonclassical first-order theory is not a second-order theory.
(a) 2 nd order (b) nonclassical 1 st order Figure 1 : Illustration of the argument. In both diagrams (a) and (b), we must imagine for illustrative purposes that all things in the universe of Def. 1.1 are represented on the horizontal and vertical axes. In diagram (a), the dotted black line represents a functional relation Φ: each dot corresponds to a constant ur-function f {α} that maps an argument α, whose value is on the horizontal axis, to its image β, whose value is on the vertical axis. So, a second-order quantifier ∀Φ corresponds to a class of simple quantifiers ranging over ur-functions (one quantifier for each thing on the horizontal axis). In diagram (b) it is indicated of which things on the horizontal axis the set X is made up, and the black dots within the red oval represent a set of constant ur-functions. A multiple quantifier (∀f {α} ) α∈X thus corresponds to a set of simple quantifiers (one quantifier for each thing in the set X). So this is a far cry from a second-order quantifier, which corresponds to a class of simple quantifiers!
Conclusions
In this paper a finitely axiomatized nonclassical first-order theory T has been introduced, and a number of arguments have been presented as to why T might be applicable as a foundational theory for mathematics. First of all, it has been proven that T is stronger than ZF in the sense that (i) ZF is implied and (ii) the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, which holds for ZF, does not hold for T . There is then the obvious risk that T is not (relatively) consistent, but in any case it has been proved that T doesn't allow the construction of a set of all sets. Secondly, it has been proved that the axioms of a category hold for the universe of T , which is a category of sets and functions on sets: this universe might then serve as the ontological basis for the various (large) categories studied in category theory. Thirdly, it has been demonstrated that T is easy to use in everyday's mathematical practice because we can define a function f X on a set X by simply giving a function prescription f X : X → Y , f X : α → ιβΦ(α, β) for some functional relation Φ: T then guarantees that F X exists, as well as its graph, its image set, and the reverse image sets for every element of its domain-defining a function is constructing a set. On the other hand, the present theory T gives immediately rise to at least four purely aesthetical arguments for rejection. First of all, the universe of T contains sets and functions on sets, the latter being objects sui generis: this entails a departure from the adage 'everything is a set' that holds in the framework of ZF, and that will be enough to evoke feelings of dislike among mathematical monists who hold the position that set theory, in particular ZF, has to be the foundation for mathematics. Secondly, although the universe of T is a category, the formal language of T contains the ∈-relation as an atomic formula: the ∈-relation is, thus, not reduced to a mapping in the language of category theory, and that fact alone will be enough to evoke feelings of dislike among mathematical monists who hold the position that category theory has to be the foundation for mathematics. Thirdly, although the number of nonlogical axioms of T is finite, multiple universal elimination gives an uncountably infinite scheme of logical axioms once an infinite set X has been constructed: this has been suggested by a colleague as a reason to reject T -the reply, however, is that the pair axiom of ZF, which has the form ∀x 1 ∀x 2 Ψ, yields uncountably many instances of the logical axiom ∀x 1 ∀x 2 Ψ ⇒ [x 1 , x 2 \x 1 , x 2 ]Ψ as well, as soon as we have constructed the infinite set ω = {∅, {∅}, {{∅}}, . . .}: its powerset P(ω) is namely uncountably infinite. Fourthly, the language of T entails a departure from classical first-order language: that will be enough to evoke feelings of dislike among those who attache a notion of beauty to the classical first-order language of ZF, or who consider that the language of category theory is all of the language of mathematics.
That said, a limitation of the present study is that it has not been investigated whether the calculus has any of the various soundness and completeness properties-(dis-)proving that is a research project in itself. Of course, contrary to the aesthetic arguments mentioned above, which can be dismissed as nonmathematical, negative results in that direction may yield a serious, mathematical argument to reject the present nonclassical theory as a foundation for mathematics.
We therefore cannot but conclude this paper with the cliche that further research is necessary: additional results are needed to establish whether the nonclassical theory T introduced in this paper constitutes an advancement in the foundations of mathematics. The proven fact that T is stronger than ZF may provide a reason for such further research, but it is emphasized that it may turn out to be a dead end. That is to say: the present marriage of set theory and category theory may look promising from a certain perspective, but it still may end in divorce.
